

Robot Security – Challenges and Opportunities

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- Why bother with security?
- Security in the Robot Operating System (ROS)
- How (easy) security enhancements can/could be implemented
- Where security can(not) be added „on top“

- Newly evolving vulnerabilities in industrial control networks
 - Internet of Things
 - Teleworking / remote access
 - Cloud computing
 - Bring your own device
 - ...
- Several successful attacks have been reported (not always officially)
 - Stuxnet
 - Jeep hack
 - Robots manipulated to put less welding points
 - ...

- Actually: not part of the design so far – many vulnerabilities*
- Message transmission between **talker** and **listener** on different **topics** (**publish/subscribe** model)
 - Logging ✓
 - no authentication → malicious talkers can fiddle with the system
injection of messages (person-in-the-middle)
→ „replacements“ of existing talkers/listeners is most trivial
 - no encryption → unauthorized listeners can gather information

* D.D. Mascarenas, J. McClean, C.J. Stull, C.R. Farrar: *Preliminary Cyber-Physical Security Assessment of the Robot Operating System (ROS)*, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report LA-UR-13-23117, 2013.

- Authentication of talkers/listeners
 - Registration: challenge-response authentication of legitimate components (use certificates)
 - Sending messages: mandatory digital signature
 - Receiving messages: reject if not signed or signature invalid
- Confidentiality
 - use topic-key shared between all talkers/listeners
 - illegitimate talkers cannot produce „understandable“ messages
 - illegitimate listeners won't understand what others talk about
- Accountability: investigate log files → find cause of malfunctions

- Several things **can be done** on the application layer (→ „on top“)
 - Authentication
 - Encryption
- Other things, like
 - preventing to sublet identities (keys)
 - impersonation / replacement of legitimate components
 - denial-of-service attacks
 - ...

cannot be prevented without either

- applying changes to ROS
 - using hardware security
- } → „inherently“

- ROS has serious design issues related to security
- Some issues can be settled on the application level
- Comprehensive security requires changes to the operating system
→ ongoing and future work

- Join forces and expertises!
(robot experts + security people ⇒ safe & secure industrial control applications)

Discussion is open...

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